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ERISA ARBITRATION-PARTICIPANT IN UNFUNDED DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PLAN REQUIRED TO SUBMIT CLAIM TO ENFORCE
TERMS OF PLAN TO ARBITRATION
Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. (1985)
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) l in response to the increasing significance of employee
benefit plans, and in recognition of the importance of these plans to the
financial security of the workforce, the revenue of the federal govern-
ment, and the free flow of commerce.2 In order to assure the soundness
and equitable administration of these plans, ERISA provides a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme that governs reporting and disclosures par-
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), §§ 1-4082,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). ERISA was introduced in the 93rd Congress after
an extensive Senate study of private pension plans in the United States. 119
CONG. REC. 130 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEG. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIRE-
MENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 90 (1976). The study revealed that there
had been rapid growth in the size, scope, and number of employee benefit plans.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Moreover, the Senate found the well-being of employees
and their families to be directly affected by private pension plans, noting that
pension plans had become a major factor "affecting the stability of employment
and the successful development of industrial relations." Id. Senator Williams of
New Jersey expressed deep concern about the security of many pension plan
participants:
Our study shows that private pension plans repeatedly fail to fulfill
their promise of retirement security. The subcommittee provided a
public forum, for the first time, for workers who have suffered because
of such failures, and we listened to one heartbreaking story after an-
other of dashed hopes, broken promises, and the bleak despair of a
poverty-stricken old age.
119 CONG. REC. 130 (1973), reprinted in I LEG. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RE-
TIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 90 (1976) (quoting Senator Williams).
The study further found that these plans had become an important factor in
commerce due to the interstate nature of the activities of employers, employee
organizations, and plan participants. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a).
Once aware of the critical role that pension income plays to an average re-
tiree, Congress became concerned that plan participants were not adequately
informed about the operation of benefit plans, and that as a result, their financial
interests were not being adequately safeguarded. 119 CONG. REC. 130 (1973),
reprinted in 1 LEG. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
OF 1974 90 (1976). For these reasons, Congress, through ERISA, established
reporting and disclosure requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). In addition,
ERISA set forth minimum standards for participation, vesting, and funding, and
also defined the fiduciary responsibilities of plan administrators. See id.
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ticipation and vesting,4 funding,5 and fiduciary responsibility. 6  In
addition, the Act provides for the enforcement of its substantive provi-
sions and the terms of individual plans. 7
In Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. ,8 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals considered an issue of first impression that arose out of a dis-
pute involving an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA. 9 The court
4. The participation and vesting standards of ERISA are set forth at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
5. The funding of employee benefit plans is governed by 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1081-1086.
6. The fidicuary responsibility pFovisions of ERISA are set forth at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 100 1(b). Remedies for violations of the requirements of ER-
ISA are established by the administration and enforcement provisions. 29
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145. These remedies include civil and criminal penalties. See
id. § § 1131-1132. The Act also provides for the award of reasonable attorney's
fees and costs of action. See id. § 11 3 2(g).
8. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985). The panel consisted of Circuit Judges
Sloviter and Becker, with Judge Fullam of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sitting by designation. Id. at 926. Judge
Sloviter wrote the opinion of a unanimous panel. Id.
9. Id. The court first had to determine which of ERISA's various regulatory
provisions apply to unfunded deferred compensation plans for management and
highly compensated employees. Id. at 929-3 1. The court concluded that ERISA
does not grant a blanket exemption for such plans, but does exempt them from
some of its substantive provisions. Id. at 941. For a discussion of the court's
reasoning, see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
ERISA does not define "unfunded plans." The Act does, however, exempt
certain unfunded plans from its participation and vesting, funding, and fiduciary
responsibility requirements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1). For
a discussion of these provisions, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
ERISA grants the Department of Labor authority to issue regulations to exempt
benefit plans from its disclosure and reporting provisions, and to issue such reg-
ulations as are necessary to carry out the regulatory provisions of the Act. 29
U.S.C. §§ 1024(a)(3), 1135. To date, the regulations issued by the Department
of Labor indicate that unfunded plans are those in which benefits are paid solely
from the general assets of the employer, and in which plan assets are not segre-
gated in any way from the general assets of the employer. For example, one
regulation exempts unfunded or insured welfare plans, maintained by an em-
ployer for the purpose of providing benefits to a select group of management or
highly compensated employees, from the reporting and disclosure requirements
of ERISA. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-24 (1985). The regulation limits the exemp-
tion to plans "[flor which benefits (i) are paid as needed solely from the general
assets of the employer, or (ii) are provided exclusively through insurance con-
tracts or policies, the premiums for which are paid directly by the employer from
its general assets .. " Id. at 2520.104-24(c)(4); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(k)
(1985) (unfunded scholarship plans excluded from Title I of ERISA are those
under which payments are made solely from general assets of employer or em-
ployee organization); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-27 (1985) (alternative method of
compliance with reporting and disclosure requirements available to benefit
plans maintained by employee organization when plan is paid for out of organi-
zation's general assets).
A primary purpose underlying unfunded arrangements is to enable employ-
ees to defer income to a future taxable year. See generally R. OSGOOD, THE LAW
OF PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING § 10 (1984). Under such arrangements, the
2
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addressed the question whether an employee waives access to federal
court for a dispute involving a benefit plan by agreeing to arbitrate all
disputes arising out of his employment. 10 The court held that where an
employee asserts a contractually based claim to establish or enforce
rights to benefits under the terms of a plan, the arbitration agreement
will be upheld."l The court further held, however, that where an em-
ployee's claim presents a purely statutory issue, that is, where the em-
ployee asserts a violation of a substantive provision of ERISA, the claim
is properly brought before a federal court, notwithstanding the exist-
ence of an arbitration agreement.12 Because resolution of the question
of arbitrability of claims brought under ERISA will have a significant
impact on Third Circuit practitioners and benefit plan participants alike,
it will be the focus of this casebrief.
William Barrowclough joined the investment firm of Kidder,
Peabody & Co. (Kidder, Peabody) in 1980, as a vice-president, account
representative, and investment advisor.' 3 As a condition of his employ-
ment, Barrowclough signed an agreement to arbitrate all disputes aris-
ing from his employment or its termination. 14 Both the New York and
American Stock Exchanges require that all brokers with member firms
sign these arbitration agreements. 15 During his employment Barrow-
clough participated in an unfunded, deferred compensation plan (Plan)
established by Kidder, Peabody for its executives who earned more than
employee has not received income, which would be taxable immediately, but
merely a promise of later payment. Id. However, if an asset has been set aside
from the employer's general assets, the employee is considered to have received
income that is taxable immediately. Id.; see also Goodman and Stone, Exempt Com-
pensation Arrangements under ERISA, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 445 (1979) (discussing
unfunded deferred compensation arrangements).
Deferred compensation plans are specifically covered by ERISA, which de-
fines "employee pension benefit plans" to include "any plan, fund, or program
which ... results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
10. 752 F.2d at 937.
11. Id. at 939.
12. Id. at 939-41.
13. Id. at 926. Barrowclough was affiliated with Kidder, Peabody's Morris-
town, New Jersey office. Id.
14. Id. at 927-28.
15. Id. at 928. The agreement with the New York Stock Exchange provided
in part:
Any controversy between me and any member or member organization
arising out of my employment or the termination of my employment
shall be settled by arbitration at the instance of any such party in ac-
cordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed in the Constitution
and Rules then obtaining of the Exchange.
Id. at 928 n.3. The American Stock Exchange agreement was essentially the
same, except it provided that disputes be arbitrated according to the Rules of
the American Stock Exchange, unless the employer was also a member of the
New York Stock Exchange, in which case, the Rules of the New York Stock Ex-
change would apply. Id.
3
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$75,000 per year. 16 Late in 1982 Kidder, Peabody discharged Barrow-
clough, claiming that the company was obliged to recredit losses of ap-
proximately $165,000 to two customers due to Barrowclough's
mismanagement of their accounts.1 7 Before discharging him, Kidder,
Peabody obtained Barrowclough's signed agreement to pay the com-
pany the amount returned to the customers. 18
After his discharge, Barrowclough wrote to Kidder, Peabody on
four separate occasions requesting an accounting and payment of the
amount in his deferred compensation account. 19 Kidder, Peabody did
not provide the requested accounting, and instead indicated its inten-
tion to set-off the amounts credited to customers for losses attributable
to Barrowclough's mismanagement against the amount due Barrow-
clough from the Plan.20 In June, 1983, Barrowclough filed suit against
Kidder, Peabody in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey.2 1 Barrowclough alleged violations of the substantive provi-
sions of ERISA and breach of the terms of the Plan, seeking damages
and attorneys fees. 22
Kidder, Peabody filed a demand in a New York state court for arbi-
tration of Barrowclough's claims, relying on Barrowclough's agreements
16. Id. at 926. The plan allowed highly paid executives to reduce their tax
liability by deferring some of their income. Id. For a discussion of deferred
compensation plans, see supra note 9. The sums were kept in an interest-bearing
account credited to the participant. 752 F.2d at 926. Title to and beneficial
interest in the account, however, remained with the company until disburse-
ment. Id.
17. Id. at 927.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Plan provided that the sums maintained by Kidder, Peabody
were payable to the participant or beneficiary upon the occurrence of the em-
ployee's retirement, death, disability, or termination. Id. at 926.
20. Id. at 927. One letter from Robert Krantz, Vice-President, Secretary,
and General Counsel of Kidder, Peabody's New York office, advised Barrow-
clough that "[i]n view of the amounts involved, this means we do not anticipate
that we shall be making any fdrther payments to you." Id. Once suit was filed,
Kidder, Peabody did send Barrowclough an "Annual Deferred Compensation
Statement," showing an account balance of $89,072.70 as of December 31,
1982. Id.
21. Id. Barrowclough also joined as defendants the Board of Directors, the
Management Committee of Kidder, Peabody, the Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.
Deferred Compensation Plan, and individual members of the Deferred Compen-
sation Committee charged with administration of the Plan. Id. The beneficiaries
of the account were named as additional plaintiffs. Id.
22. Id. The complaint consisted of 19 counts, including: 1) a claim to en-
force the terms of the Kidder, Peabody plan; 2) a claim for liquidated damages
for failure to provide an accounting as required under the reporting and disclo-
sure provisions of ERISA; 3) an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA and common law; 4) an allegation that Kidder, Peabody's set-off of Bar-
rowclough's alleged debt against the sum in his account diverted benefits to the
use of non-participants in violation of the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
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with the American and New York Stock Exchanges to arbitrate all dis-
putes that arose from his employment. 23 Kidder, Peabody also filed mo-
tions in the federal district court to compel arbitration, 24 to stay the
district court proceedings pending arbitration, 25 and to dismiss or grant
summary judgment on the ERISA claims. 26 Barrowclough filed a cross-
motion in the New York state court to enjoin the arbitration, arguing,
inter alia, that federal law and public policy require that courts not com-
pel arbitration of ERISA claims. 27
The district court issued two separate opinions in this case. In its
first opinion, the court granted Kidder, Peabody's motion to compel ar-
bitration. 28 In its second opinion, the court addressed the ERISA claims
presented. 29 Failing to find merit in the allegations of violations of ER-
23. For the text of these agreements, see supra note 15.
24. 752 F.2d at 928. Kidder, Peabody filed its motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court which, save for such agreement, would havejurisdiction under title 28 . . .for an order directing that such arbitra-
tion proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement....
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
25. 752 F.2d at 928. Kidder, Peabody filed its motion to stay the district
court proceedings pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application
of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
26. 752 F.2d at 928.
27. Id. Barrowclough also argued that the presence of plaintiffs and de-
fendants who had not signed the arbitration agreements precluded arbitration of
the dispute. Id. For a list of the additional parties to the action, see supra note
21.
28. 752 F.2d at 928. In its first opinion, the district court found that the
"arbitration agreement was valid and binding and covered the dispute between
the parties." Id. The court also ruled that thejoinder of Barrowclough's benefi-
ciaries as plaintiffs did not affect the applicability of the agreements to the dis-
pute, even though they had not signed the agreements. Id. In addition, the
court found that "the joinder of defendants other than Kidder, Peabody did not
preclude arbitration." Id. The court granted Kidder, Peabody's motion to com-
pel arbitration and denied Barrowclough's motion to stay arbitration, subject to
modification by its subsequent decision on Barrowclough's ERISA claims. Id.
29. Id. The district court addressed three separate ERISA claims. First, the
court considered whether Barrowclough stated a valid claim for a violation of
the ERISA provision forbidding diversion of plan funds to the employer. d.
The relevant ERISA section, otherwise known as the exclusive benefit rule, pro-
vides that "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer
and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants
5
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ISA, the district court granted summary judgment for Kidder, Peabody
on all the substantive ERISA claims, and entered an order compelling
arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange of Barrowclough's
claim for breach of the terms of the Plan.
3 0
in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of ad-
ministering the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). The court concluded, however,
that the Plan was exempt from the exclusive benefit rule. 752 F.2d at 928. In
support of its conclusion, the court relied on a provision in ERISA stating that
the fiduciary responsibility provisions do not apply to "a plan which is unfunded
and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing de-
ferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated
employees .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1).
Second, the court considered whether Barrowclough stated a valid claim for
violation of the ERISA provision requiring an accounting on request. 752 F.2d
at 928. The accounting requirement of ERISA provides:
Each administrator of an employee pension benefit plan shall furnish to
any plan participant or beneficiary who so requests in writing, a state-
ment indicating, on the basis of the latest available information-
(1) the total benefits accrued, and
(2) the non-forfeitable pension benefits, if any, which have ac-
crued, or the earliest date on which benefits will become non-
forfeitable.
29 U.S.C. § 1025(a). The Act also provides for damages of up to $100 a day for
failure to comply with the reporting provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). In ad-
dition, the Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to prescribe alternative meth-
ods of compliance with the reporting and disclosure requirements. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1030. In 1975, the Secretary established alternative methods of compliance
for administrators of unfunded or insured pension plans maintained by an em-
ployer for a select group of management or highly compensated employees. See
29 C.F.R. 2520.104-23 (1975). Finding that the regulation providing alternative
methods of compliance negated the need to supply the requested accounting,
the district court held that the disclosure and reporting requirements of ERISA
did not apply to the Plan. 752 F.2d at 928.
Finally, the court ruled that Barrowclough did not state a valid claim for
damages and attorney's fees under the administrative and enforcement provi-
sions of ERISA because these provisions did not grant independent substantive
rights. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (authorizing liquidated damages for failure to
comply with Act's reporting provisions); § 1132(g)(1) (authorizing award of rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs of action at court's discretion).
30. 752 F.2d at 929. Barrowclough relied upon the following language of
the Plan in support of his claim that Kidder, Peabody had breached the express
terms of the Plan:
Unless otherwise permitted by the Committee, the right of any Partici-
pating Employee or his Beneficiary to any payment under the Plan shall
not be subject in any manner to attachment or other legal process for
the debts of such Participating Employee or his Beneficiary and any
such payment shall not be subject to anticipation, alienation, sale,
transfer, assignment or encumbrance in each case to the extent permit-
ted by applicable law.
Id. at 926 n.2. Barrowclough claimed Kidder, Peabody had breached the terms
of its agreement by holding his accrued benefits in satisfaction of an alleged
debt. Id. at 927.
In compliance with the district court's order, the case went to arbitration.
752 F.2d at 929. The arbitrators' decision instructed Kidder, Peabody to pay
Barrowclough $89,072.70, plus interest, representing the amount due on his ac-
6
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On appeal, the Third Circuit dealt first with the applicability of ER-
ISA and its specific provisions to the Kidder, Peabody plan. The court
concluded that ERISA does cover unfunded deferred compensation
plans,3 1 and that, contrary to the assertions of Kidder, Peabody, such
plans are not exempt from the reporting and disclosure or from the ad-
ministration and enforcement provisions of the Act.3 2
count. The arbitrators awarded Kidder, Peabody $100,000 on its counterclaim.
Id. at n.6.
31. Id. at 930. The court based its conclusion on the broad definition of
"employee pension benefit plans" in ERISA, which includes "any plan, fund, or
program which... results in a deferral of income by employees .. " 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2)(B).
32. 752 F.2d at 930. The court based this conclusion on the fact that the
provisions relating to reporting and disclosure and the provisions relating to
administration and enforcement did not contain language exempting unfunded
deferred compensation plans, similar to that found in other provisions. Id. at
930-31; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (governing reporting and disclosure);
§§ 1131-1144 (governing administration and enforcement). Parts 2, 3, and 4 of
ERISA, which respectively concern participation and vesting, funding, and fidu-
ciary responsibility, each provides: "This part shall apply to any employee bene-
fit plan . . . other than . . . a plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an
employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a
select group of management or highly compensated employees .. " 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1051, 1081(a), 1101(1). The Appellate Court considered this language to
demonstrate a clear congressional intent to exempt unfunded deferred compen-
sation plans from these provisions. 752 F.2d at 930.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment on Count I, which alleged breach of the terms of the plan. 752 F.2d at
937. The district court concluded that a violation of a substantive provision of
ERISA is a condition precedent to an action under the Act to recover amounts
due under the terms of a benefit plan. Id. at 935. Because the district court
believed the Plan to be exempt from these substantive provisions, the district
court reasoned that Barrowclough had no cause of action under the administra-
tive and enforcement provisions of ERISA. Id. For a discussion of the court's
reasoning concerning the Plan's exemption from the substantive provisions of
ERISA, see supra note 29.
In reversing, the Third Circuit held that ERISA contemplates two separate
causes of action: 1) to redress violations of the substantive provisions of the Act,
and 2) to recover amounts due under the terms of a plan. Id. at 935. Thus, the
court reasoned that participants in benefit plans covered by ERISA are entitled
to access to federal courts to enforce the terms of their plans, regardless of
whether a substantive provision of ERISA has been violated. Id. at 937. In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon express language of ERISA. Id.;
see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (participant or beneficiary may bring civil action "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan .. "); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (participant, beneficiary, or fidu-
ciary may bring civil action "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain appropri-
ate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.").
Additionally, the civil enforcement provision of the Act provides that fed-
eral district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all civil suits brought under
ERISA, except that state courts and federal district courts have concurrent juris-
diction of actions brought to recover benefits due under a plan, to enforce the
1172
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Turning to the arbitration issues, the Third Circuit began its analy-
sis by addressing Barrowclough's contention that the district court erred
in compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.3 3 First,
Barrowclough claimed that he had not agreed to submit disputes arising
under the Plan to arbitration.34 He argued that the agreement, which
provided for arbitration of all disputes "arising out of my employment
or the termination of my employment," did not encompass disputes
arising under the Plan. 35 In response, the court observed that similar
arbitration agreements executed by other brokers with the stock ex-
changes had been broadly construed to cover "all disputes" arising from
employment or termination of employment. 36  Moreover, the court
terms of a plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under a plan. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(1). The Barrowclough court reasoned that the provision for concurrent
jurisdiction would be meaningless if a participant could not bring a claim for
breach of the terms of a plan under ERISA alone. 752 F.2d at 936.
The court also vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on
Count II, which alleged failure to provide a requested accounting of accrued
pension benefits. Id. at 934. For a discussion of the reporting and disclosure
requirements of ERISA, see supra note 29. On this issue, the district court ruled
that Barrowclough did not state a cause of action, because the Kidder, Peabody
plan had been exempted from the reporting and disclosure requirements of
ERISA by an administrative regulation. 752 F.2d at 932. The Third Circuit
agreed that the Plan was exempt from these requirements, but noted that the
regulation granting this exemption prescribed alternative procedures for satisfy-
ing the reporting and disclosure requirements, and remanded for resolution of
material issues of fact as to whether Kidder, Peabody had complied with these
alternative procedures. Id. The regulation relied upon was promulgated by the
Department of Labor and is codified at 29 C.F.R. 2520.104-23 (1985).
The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count
IV, which alleged breach of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA, finding that
the Kidder, Peabody plan was exempt from the Act's fiduciary responsibility pro-
visions. 752 F.2d at 935. Barrowclough alleged that the withholding of plan
benefits in satisfaction of a debt violated the "exclusive benefit rule" of ERISA,
and, therefore, constituted a breach of fiduciary responsibility under the Act. Id.
The court found that because the Kidder, Peabody plan was exempt from the
fidiciary responsibility provisions of ERISA, the exclusive benefit rule did not
apply. Id. For a discussion of this exemption and the text of the exclusive bene-
fit rule, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Count III of Barrowclough's complaint alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA and common law. 752 F.2d at 927. For a discussion of Count III,
see supra note 22. Barrowclough did not raise Count III on appeal, but the court
noted that because it raised the same issues as Count IV, its disposition would
follow that of Count IV. 752 F.2d at 928 n.4.
33. 752 F.2d at 937. The district court ordered submitted to arbitration
only Barrowclough's state law claims, having granted summary judgment for
Kidder, Peabody on the ERISA claims. Id. The Third Circuit observed that its
holding that Counts I and II possibly stated claims under ERISA altered the
arbitration question. Id. To provide guidance on remand, the court addressed
the arbitration issues raised by Barrowclough's reinstated ERISA claims. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 937-38. Barrowclough argued that because the arbitration agree-
ments did not expressly refer to the Plan or waive any rights under the Plan, he
had not agreed to submit disputes arising under the Plan to arbitration. Id.
36. Id. at 938. The court relied on a Sixth Circuit decision to support its
8
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noted that "a 'healthy regard' for the federal policy favoring arbitration
requires that 'any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues be
resolved in favor of arbitration.' -37 Thus, the court concluded that the
arbitration agreement covered the dispute at hand.3 8
Next, Barrowclough argued that the district court erred in compel-
ling arbitration since the stock exchanges imposed the arbitration agree-
ments on him as a condition of registration as a broker.3 9 The court
refused, however, to rule that the arbitration agreements were invalid
solely because they were required of all brokers who registered with the
stock exchanges. 40
position that the dispute was covered by the arbitration agreement. Id. (citing
Stokes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 523 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1975)
(dispute over profit sharing plan arose out of employment or termination of em-
ployment; arbitration ordered)).
The Third Circuit had reached a different conclusion on similar facts in Ay-
res v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1010 (1976). For a discussion of Ayres, see infra note 118.
37. 752 F.2d at 938 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
38. 752 F.2d at 939. The court also rejected Barrowclough's argument that
the arbitration agreements were unenforceable because Barrowclough's contin-
gent beneficiaries had not signed them. Id. at 938. In support of its conclusion
that the arbitration agreements were enforceable, the court stated that
"[F]ederal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement. Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement
must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties
to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement." Id. (quoting
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983)
(emphasis supplied by court) (footnotes omitted)).
The court stated that " 'as a matter of its discretion to control its docket'
[the district court] may 'stay litigation among the nonarbitrating parties pending
the outcome of arbitration.' " 752 F.2d at 938 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., 460 U.S. at 20 n.23). However, the court concluded that because the in-
terests of the nonparties to the agreement were so closely related to those of the
principals, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the
arbitration of Barrowclough's claims. Id.
In addition, the court found that other circuits had recognized that nonsig-
natories may be bound by arbitration agreements under common law contract
and agency principles. Id. (citing In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d
789 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff may not assert agency relationship as basis for
claims in judicial forum and then disavow agency relationship in order to defeat
arbitration agreement); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960)
(nonsignatory's amenability to arbitration under arbitration clause in contract is
decided by determining whether signatory entered into contract as alter ego of
nonsignatory)).
In a related argument, Barrowclough contended that the arbitration agree-
ments were unenforceable because of the presence of defendants who had not
signed the agreements but were being sued as representatives of Kidder,
Peabody. 752 F.2d at 938. The court rejected this argument because the addi-
tional defendants did not object to arbitration. Id.
39. Id. at 937.
40. Id. The Barrowclough court cited several cases in support of its conclu-
sion that the arbitration agreements were not void as contracts of adhesion. Id.
(citing O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 667 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.
1174 [Vol. 31: p. 1166
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Finally, the court addressed Barrowclough's contention that arbitra-
tion undermines the strong policy of ERISA in favor of providing bene-
fit claimants access to the federal courts.4 ' The court acknowledged
that the enactment of ERISA had indeed established a strong policy in
favor of access to the courts, but observed that the Federal Arbitration
Act embodied a conflicting federal policy favoring enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements. 4 2 Confronted with these two conflicting principles,
the Third Circuit held that "claims to establish or enforce rights to ben-
efits under [ERISA's enforcement provisions] that are independent of
claims based on violations of the substantive provisions of ERISA are
subject to arbitration, while claims of statutory violations can be brought
in a federal court notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate."'43 Under
the accommodation reached by the Barrowclough court, claimants assert-
ing contractual violations of a benefit plan subject to an arbitration
agreement must arbitrate, while those asserting substantive violations of
ERISA will have access to federal court.
In holding that contractually based pension claims are subject to
arbitration, the court relied on the parallel drawn in a House conference
report on ERISA between section 502 of ERISA and section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), each of which pro-
vides for concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over contractu-
ally based claims. 4 4 The court concluded that in enacting ERISA,
1982) (experienced businessman presumed to have read and understood arbi-
tration agreement signed when he joined member firm of National Association
of Securities Dealers; obligation to arbitrate not extinguished by resignation
from Association and brokerage firm); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 353-54
(2d Cir.) (exchange requirement of arbitration of all disputes between registered
representatives and member firms does not violate antitrust laws), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 948 (1978)).
41. 752 F.2d at 939. For a discussion of the policy of ERISA favoring ac-
cess to federal courts, see supra note 32.
42. 752 F.2d at 939. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that written
agreements to arbitrate disputes "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity or for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The legislative history of the Act reveals that
Congress intended to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as
other contracts," and to overrule the traditional refusal of courts to enforce such
agreements. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
43. 752 F.2d at 939 (citations omitted).
44. Id. The LMRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). For a dis-
cussion of the purpose of the LMRA, see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
The court noted the legislative history of ERISA suggests that its civil enforce-
ment provision was patterned after that of the LMRA:
The U.S. district courts are to have exclusive jurisdiction with respect
to actions involving breach of fiduciary responsibility as well as exclu-
sive jurisdiction over other actions to enforce or clarify benefit rights
provided under title I. However, with respect to suits to enforce benefit
rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan which do
not involve application of the title I provisions, they may be brought
not only in U.S. district courts but also in state courts of competent
jurisdiction. All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be re-
10
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Congress intended that contractually based pension claims, like contrac-
tually based claims for breach of collective bargaining agreements, re-
main subject to valid arbitration agreements. 4 5  Applying this
conclusion, the court held that Count I of Barrowclough's claim, seeking
to enforce the terms of the Plan, was subject to arbitration.4 6
In contrast to the contractually based claim of Count I, Count II,
which sought damages for failure to provide an accounting as required
by ERISA, 4 7 presented the court with a purely statutory issue. 4 8 In
holding that Count II should not be referred to arbitration, the court
relied primarily on two considerations. First, the court emphasized the
"inherent incompatibility" in compelling arbitration of a claim that Con-
gress has placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
under a comprehensive federal statutory scheme designed to protect a
group of individuals. 49 Second, the court noted the need for federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over statutory issues in order to carry out
the intent of Congress that fiduciaries, administrators, and participants
have a consistent source of law to assist them in determining the legality
garded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion
to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947. The U.S. district courts are to have jurisdiction of
these actions without regard to the amount in controversy and without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5107.
45. 752 F.2d at 939. The LMRA provides: "Suits for violations of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
However, the Supreme Court, in three landmark decisions known as the
Steelworker's Trilogy, instructed that courts should defer to arbitration in disputes
concerning the meaning, interpretation, and application of collective bargaining
agreements. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46 n.6 (1974).
The three decisions of the Steelworker's Trilogy are: United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (courts should decline to review
merits of arbitration award under collective bargaining agreement); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (judicial
inquiry must be limited to question of whether parties agreed to arbitrate griev-
ance; doubts concerning interpretation of scope of arbitration clause to be re-
solved in favor of coverage); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960) (court confined to issue of whether grievance is covered by arbi-
tration agreement; court may not weigh merits of grievance). In United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Court stated, "[a]n order to arbitrate the
particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. 363 U.S. at 582-83. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage." Id. at 583.
46. 752 F.2d at 940.
47. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025, 1132(c). For a discussion of these sections, see
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48. 752 F.2d at 940.
49. Id.
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of proposed actions affecting benefit plans.50 The court stated that
"[tihis intent would be frustrated if arbitrators, who are not bound to
consider law or precedent in their decisions and who decide issues pri-
marily on contractual grounds, had a conclusive role in deciding such
claims." 5 1
In Barrowclough, the court identified several parallels between ER-
ISA and the LMRA. 5 2 The court observed that both are enabling stat-
utes designed to provide access to federal courts to establish or enforce
contractual rights, and both contemplate the development and applica-
tion of federal common law principles to contractual disputes. 5 3 Having
established this similarity, the court noted that when confronted with
the conflicting policies favoring arbitration and access to federal court in
a labor context, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that contractually based claims arising from a breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement are subject to a presumption of arbitrability. 54 Rely-
ing on the parallel between ERISA and the LMRA, the Barrowclough
court held that when conflict between access to court and arbitration
arises in the context of benefit plan disputes, contractually based benefit
plan claims should also be subject to arbitration. 55
50. Id. at 941.
51. Id. The court remanded Count II to the district court in light of its
conclusion that purely statutory issues are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Id. The court based its decision on the jurisdiction provision of
ERISA, which states, "Except for [contractually based claims to enforce the
terms of a plan], the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by
a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). Federal district
courts and state courts of competent jurisdiction have concurrent jurisdiction of
actions by participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits due under the terms
of a plan, to enforce rights under a plan, and to clarify rights to future benefits
under the terms of a plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(e)(1). For a
more complete discussion of the jurisdiction provision of ERISA, see supra note
32 and accompanying text.
52. 752 F.2d at 939.
53. Id. Specifically, the court found that:
Both [ERISA and the LMRA] provide for concurrent federal jurisdic-
tion over contractually based claims for benefits, and neither provides
specific federal legal content to govern these federal contractual claims,
thus permitting development of common law principles based at least
partly on state law experience. Given this parallelism, it is reasonable
to conclude that Congress intended that contractually-based pension
claims would remain subject to arbitration, just as contractually-based
claims for breach of collective-bargaining agreements have been held
to be subject to arbitral resolution.
Id. One author has noted the possibility that, in referring to § 301 of the LMRA,
Congress might merely have intended to indicate that federal courts were to
develop a body of federal common law pertaining to pension claims, which was
to be accepted in both federal and state courts. Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration
to Avoid Litigation under ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 215, 279 n.60 (1975).
54. For a discussion of arbitration under the LMRA, see supra note 45.
55. 752 F.2d at 939.
12
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It is submitted, however, that a deeper look into the legislative his-
tory of ERISA raises strong doubts about the court's reliance on the
conference committee's reference to section 301 of the LMRA. 56 The
version of the bill passed by the Senate and sent to the House5 7 re-
quired that each benefit plan provide an opportunity for arbitration of
disputes between the plan administrator and any plan participant.5 8
During the floor debate on the Senate bill, the sponsor of the amend-
ment that called for arbitration explained, "[t]he Department of Labor
will provide by regulation for the type of arbitration service provisions
which are to be incorporated in the [plans]." '5 9 It is evident from this
language that the Senate contemplated the use of arbitration procedures
only if they were carefully regulated to assure the preservation of the
rights of plan participants.
Furthermore, the Senate did not contemplate that arbitration would
be an exclusive remedy. The Senate bill provided that a participant
56. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the parallels between ERISA
and § 301 of the LMRA, see supra note 53.
57. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 2 LEG. HISTORY OF
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 1883 (1976).
58. Section 691 of the Senate bill provided:
(a) ARBITRATION PROCEDURE-Each employee pension benefit plan
subject to this part shall provide-
(1) a procedure for the fair and just review under the plan of any
dispute between the administrator of the plan and any participant or
beneficiary of the plan, and
(2) an opportunity after such review and a decision by the admin-
istrator (or a failure to make a decision within a reasonable period of
time by the administrator), for the arbitration of such disputes.
(b) CIVIL ACTIONS-A participant or beneficiary of such a plan may
bring a civil action . . .in lieu of submitting the dispute to arbitration
under the plan.
(c) ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES-If a dispute under a plan is subject to
procedures established by collective bargaining for the resolution of
such dispute, the Secretary of Labor, upon written request by a plan
administrator, may waive the application of subsections (a), (b), and (e)
to such dispute if he determines that the procedures provided for are
reasonably fair and effective.
(d) APPLICATION OF LAw RELATING TO SECTION 301 oF LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947-The arbitration of disputes in accord-
ance with the requirements of this section, and judicial proceedings
relating thereto, shall be governed by the laws, decisions, and rule ap-
plicable to the arbitration of disputes under section 301 of [the LMRA].
(e) PAYMENT OF ARBITRATION COSTs-The cost of any arbitration pro-
ceedings required under this section (including arbitrators' fees) shall
be paid by the plan under which the dispute arises, unless the arbitrator
determines that a participant's or beneficiary's allegations are frivolous
and assesses all or a portion of such cost to that party.
H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 691 (1973), reprinted in 2 LEG. HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 1883, 2096-98 (1976).
59. 119 CONG. REC. 30,041 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Nelson), reprinted in 2
LEG. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
1632 (1976).
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could choose to bring a civil action instead of submitting the dispute to
arbitration. 60 This right was qualified, however, in the case of partici-
pants in plans covered by collectively bargained arbitration procedures.
In such cases, the Secretary of Labor was authorized to require use of
the collectively bargained procedures, if he determined them to be "rea-
sonably fair and effective.' ' 6 1 Finally, with respect to collectively bar-
gained arbitration agreements, the bill made the law developed under
section 301 of the LMRA applicable to the arbitration of disputes "in
accordance with the requirements of this section, and judicial proceed-
ings relating thereto .. ."62
The bill as passed by the House did not contain any dispute resolu-
tion procedures. 63 As enacted, ERISA requires only that every em-
ployee benefit plan afford a reasonable opportunity for review of any
decision denying a claim for benefits. 6 4 The conference committee re-
port explained that the House conferees rejected the Senate arbitration
provisions because they might be too costly to plans and encourage friv-
olous disputes. 65 There is no indication that the members of the confer-
ence committee believed that private, unregulated arbitration presented
an acceptable method of settling disputes between plan administrators
and participants. In fact, a counter-inference is raised by the fact that
the conference committee deleted the language making the dispute res-
60. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 691(b) (1973), reprinted in 2 LEG. His-
TORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 1883, 2097
(1976). For the text of this provision, see supra note 58.
61. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 691(c) (1973), reprinted in 2 LEG. His-
TORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 1883, 2097.
This provision authorized the Secretary of Labor to waive the application of sub-
section (b), which permitted a plan participant to bring a civil action in lieu of
submitting a dispute to arbitration, in cases where a plan was covered by collec-
tively bargained arbitration procedures. Id. For the text of subsections (b) and
(c), see supra note 58.
62. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 691(d) (1973), reprinted in 2 LEG. His-
TORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 1883, 2097
(1976). However, if H.R. 4200 had been enacted, the right to select a judicial
forum would only have been restricted in cases where a plan was governed by a
collectively bargained arbitration procedure, because the bill specifically gave
participants in all other plans the right to choose a judicial forum in lieu of arbi-
tration. Id. § 691(b). For the text of both provisions, see supra note 58.
63. H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 328, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5108.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (1982).
65. 120 CONG. REC. 29,941 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams upon intro-
duction of H. CONF. REP. No. 1280), reprinted in 3 LEG. HISTORY OF THE EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 4769 (1976). Senator
Williams expressed regret at the decision of the conference committee to drop
the requirement that plans contain an arbitration procedure, stating "I regret
[their] decision since I believe the Senate bill would have provided a relatively
inexpensive way for the resolution of minor benefit disputes for the many par-
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olution principles developed under section 301 of the LMRA applicable
to disputes arising under ERISA. 66 The sole remedy authorized for plan
participants is a civil action.
Putting aside the legislative history suggesting that Congress did
not intend to authorize the arbitration of ERISA claims, it is submitted
that the Barrowclough court unduly emphasized the parallels between the
LMRA and ERISA in deciding that arbitration is a proper forum in
which to resolve an individual's benefit claims under ERISA. In a labor
context, the issue of arbitration typically arises where an employee at-
tempts to enforce rights created by a collectively bargained agree-
ment.6 7 Barrowclough, however, asserted individual rights arising from
a private agreement. 68 It is submitted that different policy considera-
tions underlie the question of whether arbitration of individual rights
under ERISA is appropriate.
In Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robins,6 9 the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed the well-settled principle that a presumption
of arbitrability is an appropriate rule of construction in determining
whether an arbitration agreement covers disputes between a union and
an employer arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. 70 The
66. The deleted language appeared in § 691(d) of H.R. 4200. For the text
of this subsection, see supra note 58.
67. See, e.g., Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robins, 466 U.S. 364
(1984) (trustees of multiemployer trust funds not required to submit dispute
over interpretation of terms in collective bargaining agreement to arbitration);
Viggiano v. Shenango Div. of Anchor Hocking Corp., 750 F.2d 276 (3d Cir.
1984) (union required to exhaust grievance procedures in dispute over em-
ployer's termination of group hospitalization plan); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
Northwestern Airlines, 627 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (union required to arbi-
trate dispute with airline over alleged violations of terms of collective bargaining
agreement).
68. For a discussion of the Kidder, Peabody plan, see supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
69. 466 U.S. 364 (1984). In Schneider, the trustee of two multiemployer
trust funds filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the employers had
failed to meet the contribution requirements established by the applicable col-
lective bargaining agreements. Id. at 366. The district court dismissed the suits
pending arbitration of disputed interpretations of terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreements. Id. at 366-67. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. On certiorari, a unanimous
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trustees could bring suit in federal
court to enforce the terms of the trust against a participating employer, without
first submitting to arbitration the underlying dispute over the interpretation of
terms in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 376.
The Court based its decision in large part on the fact that the trustees were
not parties to the collective bargaining agreements, which required arbitration
of any disputes between the union and the employers concerning the meaning of
provisions in the agreement. Id. at 375. Thus, the Court held that the presump-
tion of arbitrability typically applied to parties to the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not apply in this instance. Id. at 371-72.
70. Id. The Court observed that the presumption "furthers the national
labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes and thus best accords with
1180 [Vol. 31 : p. 1166
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Schneider Court declined, however, to apply the presumption outside that
context to a dispute between an employer and the trustees of an em-
ployee benefit fund. 7 1 The Court acknowledged the vital role of arbitra-
tion in the labor context, noting that "[a]rbitration promotes labor
peace because it requires the parties to forego the economic weapons of
strikes and lock-outs." 72 Yet the Court reasoned that where, as in Schnei-
der, the parties to the dispute did not have recourse to weapons of eco-
nomic self-help such as strikes and lock-outs, applying a presumption of
arbitrability would be inappropriate. 73 Because Barrowclough did not
have recourse to any weapons of economic self-help, it is submitted that
the presumption of arbitrability should not have been applied.
Support for the proposition that individual claims should not be
subject to the same presumption of arbitrability applied to disputes aris-
ing under a collective bargaining agreement is found in Barrentine v. Ar-
kansas-Best Freight Systems,74 in which the Supreme Court focused on the
need to distinguish between arbitration of collectively bargained rights
and arbitration of individual rights. In Barrentine, a group of truckdrivers
asserted their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 75 to
the parties' presumed objectives in pursuing collective bargaining." Id. (citing
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582-83
(1960)). The Court cautioned, however, that there is "less to recommend the
presumption in construing the applicability of arbitration clauses" to disputes
involving nonsignatories to the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 372. It is
submitted that the Court's caution applies also to situations such as that
presented in Barrowclough, where the national labor policy is not implicated and
there is no collectively bargained agreement at all.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The Court stated that "requiring [the parties] to arbitrate disputes
with the employer would promote labor peace only indirectly, if at all." Id.
74. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). In Barrentine, truckdrivers who were not paid for
time spent in a required pre-trip safety inspection submitted their wage claims to
a joint grievance committee as required by their union's collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 730. The drivers alleged that they were entitled to compensa-
tion under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The grievance committee
rejected the claim without comment. Id. at 731. The drivers then filed an action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking statutory remedies of actual
and liquidated damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Id. at 731-33. The district
court refused to consider the FLSA claims. Id. at 733. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the drivers' voluntary submission of their grievances to
the grievance committee precluded them from asserting the same claims in a
subsequent civil action. Id. at 733-34. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that because the rights asserted by the drivers were independent of the collective
bargaining process and nonwaivable, the wage claims could be brought in a fed-
eral court, despite the prior, unsuccessful submission of the claims to a griev-
ance committee. Id. at 744-45.
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). Congress enacted the FLSA pursuant to
its commerce power, having found that "detrimental" working conditions would
adversely impact interstate commerce. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739 n.14 (citing
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1941); 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982)).
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compensation for time spent in required pre-trip safety inspections. 76
The plaintiffs had previously submitted the same claim to a grievance
committee, alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement.7 7
The Court held that a claim arising under the FLSA could be brought in
federal court, and was not barred by the prior unsuccessful submission
of the claim to a grievance committee.
78
The Court described the FLSA as legislation intended to give "to
individual workers" specific minimum protections from substandard
wages and oppressive working conditions. 79 In contrast, the Court
characterized the LMRA as legislation "designed to minimize industrial
strife and improve working conditions by encouraging employees to
promote their interests collectively .... ',8 Although section 301 of the
LMRA provided for access to the federal courts, the Barrentine Court ob-
served that the enforcement of collectively bargained agreements to ar-
76. 450 U.S. at 732. The employees alleged that the time spent for pre-trip
safety inspections was compensable under 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). Id. at 732 n.7.
77. Id. at 730-31.
78. 450 U.S. at 745. The Court gave two reasons for refusing to adopt the
position that submission of a wage claim to arbitration precludes a later suit in
federal court. First, the Court observed that wage claims submitted to arbitra-
tion under a collective bargaining agreement are handled by union officials, not
by the individual employees involved. Id. at 742. The Court expressed concern
that union representatives might refuse to vigorously support an individual's
meritorious claim, noting that "a union balancing individual and collective inter-
ests might validly permit some employees' statutorily granted wage and hour
benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative expenditure of resources would result in
increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit as a whole." Id. (citing
Humphrey v. Moore, 275 U.S. 335, 349 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953)).
Second, the Court expressed concern that an employee's statutory rights
might not be adequately protected in arbitration because FLSA claims involve
complex questions of law that arbitrators frequently are not competent to de-
cide. Id. at 743. The Court added that the problem of an arbitrator's compe-
tence to decide FLSA claims is further exacerbated by the complex nature of the
statute. Id. In a related argument, the Court questioned whether an arbitrator
would have the contractual authority to apply statutory law. Id. at 744. The
Court noted that an arbitrator's power is limited by the collective bargaining
agreement, and that an arbitrator "has no general authority to invoke public
laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties." Id. (quoting Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)).
79. 450 U.S. at 739 (emphasis supplied by Court). Congress enacted the
FLSA in order to protect against "labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being of workers." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982)).
80. Id. at 739 (emphasis supplied by Court). In part, the LMRA provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
... by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
1182
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bitrate was necessary in order to effectuate that Act's purpose.8 1 The
Court recognized, however, that different considerations apply in deter-
mining the validity of arbitration agreements when the rights asserted
are individual, nonwaivable rights, such as those granted by the FLSA.82
Although a parallel between ERISA and the LMRA exists, it is sub-
mitted that the purpose of ERISA, the protection of individual benefit
plan participants and beneficiaries, more closely parallels that of the
FLSA. Congress enacted the FLSA to protect individual workers from
"the evil of 'overwork' as well as 'underpay' ",83 by establishing
mandatory wage and work week standards. 8 4 Similarly, Congress en-
acted ERISA to protect individual workers from the loss of their pension
benefits by imposing vesting, funding, fiduciary and disclosure require-
ments on pension plan sponsors and administrators.8 5 Given this simi-
larity of purpose and the focus of both acts on the preservation of
individual rights, it is submitted that participants and beneficiaries of
benefit plans governed by ERISA should be assured of the same un-
restricted access to federal courts that the Court found appropriate for
workers who assert claims under the FLSA.
Because Barrowclough asserted individual rather than collectively
bargained rights and had no recourse to economic weapons threatening
labor peace, it is submitted that the Barrowclough court could have more
appropriately justified its decision by relying exclusively on cases that
did not arise in a collective bargaining context. 86 A more appropriate
81. 450 U.S. at 739.
82. Id. at 745. The Court stated:
In sum, the FLSA rights petitioners seek to assert in this action are
independent of the collective-bargaining process. They devolve on pe-
titioners as individual workers, not as members of a collective organiza-
tion. They are not waivable. Because Congress intended to give
individual employees the right to bring their non-waivable claims under
the FLSA in court, and because these congressionally granted FLSA
rights are best protected in a judicial rather than in an arbitral forum,
we hold that petitioners' claim is not barred by the prior submission of
their grievances to the contractual dispute-resolution procedures.
Id.
83. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missal, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quot-
ing President Franklin Roosevelt's message to Congress, 81 CONG. REC. 4983,
4984 (1937)).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (establishing minimum wage requirements); 29
U.S.C. § 207(a) (mandating maximum forty hour work week and requiring that
worker be compensated for overtime "at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed").
85. For a discussion of the purpose of ERISA and its regulatory provisions,
see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
86. The facts that gave rise to the dispute over arbitrability in Barrowclough
differ in several key respects from the facts that normally exist in a traditional
labor context. First, neither the Plan nor the arbitration agreements were collec-
tively bargained. For a discussion of the Plan, see supra notes 16 & 19 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the arbitration agreements, see supra note
15 and accompanying text. Second, Barrowclough neither asserted claims that
1986] 1183
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
basis for the court's decision would have been cases applying the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, since that Act addresses the more analogous situa-
tion of enforcement of privately made arbitration agreements.8 7 In Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,8 8 a unanimous Supreme Court stated that the
overriding concern of Congress in passing the Federal Arbitration Act
was to insure that private arbitration agreements are enforced in the
same manner as other contracts. 89 The Byrd Court construed the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act to require a district court asserting jurisdiction over
an action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to compel arbitra-
tion of pendent state law claims.9 0 In so holding, the Court articulated a
clear policy that private arbitration agreements should be "rigorously
enforce[d]."91
jeopardized labor peace, nor had access to self-help remedies that would
threaten labor peace. 752 F.2d at 939. Third, Barrowclough did not negotiate
the arbitration agreements at arm's length. Rather, the agreements were im-
posed on him as a condition of employment. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Bar-
rowclough v. Kidder, Peabody, Inc., 752 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1985). Finally, the
Kidder, Peabody plan did not contain a waiver of the rights accorded by ERISA,
and the arbitration agreements did not refer to the arbitration of disputes con-
cerning the Plan. Id. at 10.
87. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Kidder, Peabody's motions to stay the district
court proceedings and to compel arbitration were filed pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act. See supra notes 24 & 25. For a discussion of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
88. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). In Byrd, a dissatisfied purchaser of securities filed
suit against a securities broker in federal district court, alleging violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of various state law provisions. Id. at 214.
Federal jurisdiction over the state law claims was based on diversity of citizen-
ship and pendent jurisdiction. Id. The broker filed a motion to sever the pen-
dent state law claims and compel arbitration of these claims, pursuant to an
agreement signed by the customer providing that any controversy arising from
transactions between the broker and the customer would be settled by arbitra-
tion. Id. The district court denied the motion to sever the pendent claims and
compel arbitration, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
at 215-16. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at 219. The Court
held that the Federal Arbitration Act "requires district courts to compel arbitra-
tion of pendent arbitrable claims.., even where the result would be the possibly
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums. Id. at 217;
see Recent Developments, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or Arbitra-
tion?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 245 (1986).
89. 470 U.S. at 219.
90. Id. at 217. The Federal Arbitration Act provides: "A written provision
in . . . a contract ...or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable and enforceable .... ." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The Court
stated that the Act does not allow federal district courts to use their discretion in
determining whether a claim should go to arbitration. 470 U.S. at 219. Rather,
the Court declared that where an arbitration agreement has been signed, "the
district court shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration." Id. at 218 (em-
phasis supplied by Court).
91. 470 U.S. at 221. One commentator has compared the impact of the
court's decision in Byrd with the impact of the Steelworkers Trilogy, observing that
" [t]he Court has put its imprimatur on a federalization of arbitration, compara-
1184 [Vol. 31 : p. 1166
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In Byrd, the Court emphasized the national policy favoring enforce-
ment of private agreements as a justification for compelling arbitra-
tion. 92 In Barrowclough, however, the court justified its decision to
compel arbitration by relying on cases involving rights under collectively
bargained agreements. 9 3 The policies underlying the presumption of
arbitrability as it evolved in the collective bargaining context were not
implicated by Barrowclough's ERISA claims. Therefore, the Barrow-
clough court should have focused instead exclusively on the Federal Arbi-
tration Act and its policy favoring enforcement of private agreements to
arbitrate.
Recognizing the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of pri-
vate arbitration agreements enunciated in Bryd, it is nonetheless submit-
ted that the Barrowclough court should have granted benefit plan
participants access to federal court for all ERISA claims, including those
that are contractually based. The Supreme Court stated in Byrd that
"[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [Federal Arbitra-
tion Act] was to enforce private agreements into which parties had en-
tered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements
to arbitrate . . . at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another
federal statute."' 94 It is submitted that Congress established such a "coun-
tervailing policy" in ERISA when it expressly provided that participants
in employee benefit plans should have ready access to federal courts to
enforce the terms of their plans.
Ample precedent exists that suggests a statutorily conferred right to
select a judicial forum should override an agreement to arbitrate. 9 5 In
ble to its role in the dramatic evolution of labor arbitration in the early 1960's."
Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1985); see also Recent Developments, supra note 88, at
245 (suggesting federal securities claims should be litigated in federal courts
until Congress, courts, and securities industry act to insure adequate protection
for investors in arbitration proceedings). For a discussion of the Steelworker's
Trilogy, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
92. 470 U.S. at 220. The court noted that Congress, in passing the statute,
intended to insure that private agreements to arbitrate would be upheld. Id.
The Court did not look to the Steelworker's Trilogy or its progeny in support of its
conclusion that arbitration should be compelled.
93. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see supra notes 43-46 and ac-
companying text.
94. 470 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added).
95. It is submitted that ERISA confers on benefit plan participants a "sub-
stantial right" to access to federal court. The Supreme Court recognized that
the right to choose a judicial forum is a "substantial right". See Boyd v. Grand
Trunk Western Ry., 338 U.S. 263 (1949). In Boyd, a railroad employee injured
on the job signed agreements with his employer limiting the venue of any action
he might bring in the future. Id. at 263. The employee later brought suit under
the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) in a jurisdiction prohibited by the
agreement. Id. at 264. The Federal Employers Liability Act contains generous
jurisdictional provisions, and includes an exculpatory provision that invalidates
any contract limiting a common carrier's liability under the Act. See 45 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1982). After the Michigan Supreme Court had upheld the agreement, the
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Wilko v. Swan, 9 6 the Supreme Court held that the Securities Act of
193397 conferred the right to select a judicial forum, and that the right
could not be waived by an arbitration agreement. In Wilko, which in-
volved an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of a securities
transaction, the Court reasoned that a securities buyer who prospec-
tively waives the right of access to federal court gives up more than a
participant in other types of transactions, because the federal securities
laws include generous jurisdiction and venue provisions. 9 8 This is
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. at 264, 266.
The Court held that a stipulation restricting an employee's choice of venue in an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act was invalid. Id. at 266. The
Court reasoned that the right to select a forum was a substantial right, and that
an agreement restricting that right would undermine the purpose of the statute.
Id. It is submitted that the substantial right analysis employed by the Boyd Court
applies in the ERISA context as well.
96. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, a customer sued a brokerage firm to
recover damages for alleged misrepresentation in the sale of securities. Id. at
429. The defendant asserted that margin agreements between the customer and
the brokerage firm, providing that all disputes concerning the securities would
be settled by arbitration, required plaintiff to proceed with arbitration. Id. Sec-
tion 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commis-
sion shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Relying on § 14, the Court held
that the arbitration agreement was void under the Securities Act of 1933. 346
U.S. at 438.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1982).
98. 346 U.S. at 435. The Securities Act of 1933 provides that the district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations
under the Act, the rules, and the regulations promulgated under the Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77v. The Act also provides that the district courts and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of all suits brought to enforce any liability or duty cre-
ated by the Act, and grants a wide choice of venue. Id. For the full text of § 77n,
see supra note 96.
The Wilko Court observed that "[w]hile a buyer and seller of securities,
under some circumstances, may deal at arm's length on equal terms, it is clear
that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which
buyers labor." 346 U.S. at 435. So too, it is submitted, Congress enacted ER-
ISA to provide benefit plan participants a vehicle to enforce their rights.
Because Dean Witter did not seek to compel arbitration of Byrd's federal
securities claims, the Court did not reach the question of whether claims arising
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) are arbitrable. 470 U.S. at
216 n.2. However, in his concurring opinion Justice White suggested that the
Wilko doctrine prohibiting arbitration of claims arising under the 1933 Act can-
not be "mechanically transplanted" to claims arising under the 1934 Act. Id. at
224 (White, J., concurring). In the wake of Byrd, several courts have held that
claims arising under the 1934 Act are subject to valid arbitration agreements.
See, e.g., Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (state law claims and federal claims arising under 1934 Act are arbitrable);
Houlihan v. Schmacker, 620 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (securities fraud claims
arising under § 10 and rule lob-5 of 1934 Act subject to arbitration); Prawer v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,395 (D. Mass. 1985)
(arbitration agreement between customer and broker enforceable with respect
to claims under 1934 Act, not enforceable with respect to claims under 1933
Act). But see Glavin v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 629 (D.
1186 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1166
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equally applicable to benefit plan participants, who enjoy similar advan-
tages under ERISA. 9 9
In addition, the Barrowclough court could have looked to Lewis v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,10 0 in which the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found significant parallels
between the Securities Act of 1933 and ERISA. The Lewis court con-
cluded that the policy of ERISA favoring access to federal courts over-
rides the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.10 ' The
court observed that both Acts were designed to protect a group of "buy-
ers" who are at the mercy of a group of "sellers."' 1 2 The court noted
that the sellers are better informed than the buyers and enjoy a superior
bargaining position. 10 3 Taking the analogy between the Securities Act
of 1933 and ERISA further, the court stated that a "pension plan partici-
pant is in reality an indirect securities investor, making his investments
S.C. 1985) (broker could not compel customer to arbitrate claims arising under
1934 Act). A recent decision by the District Court for the Southern District of
New York cited Byrd in holding that there is no statutory justification for refusing
to enforce an arbitration agreement covering claims arising under the 1934 Act.
Berner v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 18 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 258 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
31, 1985). The Berner court went on to hold that because the antifraud provi-
sions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are "virtually identical," 1933 Act claims should
also be subject to arbitration. Id. at 259. However, the Third Circuit recently
held that Byrd did not overrule its decision in Ayers v. Merrill Lynch that claims for
damages under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act are not subject to arbitration. Ja-
cobsen v. Merrill Lynch, 797 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986).
99. For a discussion of the jurisdiction provisions of ERISA, see supra notes
32 & 51. ERISA provides that an action brought in a federal district court "may
be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took
place, or where a defendant resides or may be found," and that "process may be
served in any other district where a defendant resides or may be found." 29
U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
100. 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Lewis, the plaintiff was a vested
participant in a pension plan who was informed by his former employer that his
pension plan had been forfeited when he entered employment with a competi-
tor. Id. at 273. The plaintiff sued his former employer, the pension plan, and
plan administrators, alleging various violations of ERISA. Id. The employer
sought a stay of the proceedings pending arbitration, relying on the arbitration
agreements that the plaintiff had signed and filed with the New York Stock Ex-
change in order to become a registered representative. Id. The Lewis court de-
nied the motion to stay the proceedings, holding that prospective agreements to
arbitrate ERISA claims are invalid. Id. at 278.
101. id. at 277-78. The court recognized the competing and "highly fa-
vored" policies of the Federal Arbitration Act, but concluded "ERISA was en-
acted to protect pension plan participants and beneficiaries. Exculpation from
any of the rights conferred cannot be permitted if the Act is to remain faithful to
its mandate." Id.
102. Id. at 275. In the court's analogy, the "buyers" are pension plan par-
ticipants and securities investors. Id. The "sellers" are the sponsors and admin-
istrators of pension plans, and the sellers and brokers of securities. Id.
103. Id. The court noted that pension plan participants and securities pur-
chasers are similarly situated, because both are "at the mercy of pension plan
sponsors and administrators or securities sellers and brokers, each better in-
formed and in a superior bargaining position." Id.
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through an institutional intermediary, his pension plan."' 10 4 Based on
this analogy, the court concluded that Congress had intended to protect
pension plan participants from arbitration agreements that erode feder-
ally granted rights, in the same way as it had protected securities inves-
tors.' 0 5 Thus, the court held that prospective agreements to arbitrate
ERISA claims are invalid. 10 6
Congress has declared that one purpose of ERISA is to provide
"ready access to the Federal courts."' 1 7 To this end, Congress specifi-
cally provided that a benefit plan participant is entitled to bring a civil
action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan. ' 1° 8 Read together, these
provisions are a clear expression of congressional intent to grant benefit
plan participants a right to bring all their claims, both contractual and
statutory, before the courts. The Third Circuit's decision in Barrow-
clough undermines that right. It renders meaningless the provisions that
grant plan participants with contractually based claims access to federal
courts, since employers can defeat this right by simply requiring arbitra-
tion agreements as a condition of participation in an employee benefit
plan. 0 9 Therefore, it is submitted that the Third Circuit and other
courts confronting the issue should heed the legislative history and lan-
guage of ERISA and allow all claims to be brought before federal courts.
Finally, it is submitted that the efficient use ofjudicial resources and
104. Id. The Lewis court found the comparison appropriate because inter-
est earned from a pension plan is designed to "sustain" the participant after he
retires,just as if he had taken his personal income and directly purchased securi-
ties "in lieu of employer contributions to the pension plan." Id. Furthermore,
the court found the abuses that the Securities Act was designed to eliminate,
"fraud and overreaching between securities sellers and purchasers," can also
occur between pension plan administrators and beneficiaries. Id.
105. Id. The court reasoned that ERISA can be considered a step toward
Congress' goal of "modifying the rule of caveat emptor as applied to securities
transactions." Id. at 276.
106. 431 F. Supp. at 277. The court observed that ERISA does not contain
a broad antiwaiver provision like that found in § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Id. For a discussion of the antiwaiver provision of the Federal Securities Act, see
supra note 96. ERISA contains a similar provision, but it invalidates only agree-
ments that attempt to relieve a fiduciary of liability for breach of duties that arise
under ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a). Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that even "[r]ecognizing the strong policies favor-
ing prior agreements to arbitrate the Court . . . believes that the promises of
ERISA to pension plan participants are best kept by holding prospective agree-
ments to arbitrate ERISA claims invalid." 431 F. Supp. at 278.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). For a discussion of the policy of ERISA
favoring access to the federal courts, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
For the text of these provisions, see supra notes 32 & 51 and accompanying text.
109. This concern was recognized by the Lewis court. 431 F. Supp. at 277.
For a discussion of the Lewis decision, see supra notes 100-06 and accompanying
text.
1188 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1166
23
Bragg: ERISA Arbitration - Participant In Unfunded Deferred Compensation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
overcrowded dockets were unspoken factors in the decision of the Bar-
rowclough court, and will always be important considerations when courts
weigh the merits of arbitration of a particular dispute. Chief Justice
Warren Burger has recently decried the increasing congestion and
backlogs in all the courts in the country.I10 According to the ChiefJus-
tice, the solution lies not in creating more judgeships,' I but in finding
ways of resolving private disputes without resort to the courts.1 12 Spe-
cifically, the Chief Justice has stated, "[i]f the courts are to retain public
confidence, they cannot let disputes wait two, three and five years or
more to be disposed of. The use of private arbitration is one solution,
and lawyers should be at the forefront in moving in this direction."' 13
Given the many advantages of arbitration," 4 the pressure of crowded
dockets, and precedent such as Barrowclough, it is likely that other courts
will adopt a presumption of arbitrability for contractually-based ERISA
claims. 1 5 The legislative history of ERISA suggests that arbitration
may indeed be an acceptable form of dispute resolution for these claims,
when structured so as to adequately protect the rights of plan partici-
pants.' 16 However, Congress has not established an arbitration system
for ERISA disputes, or promulgated standards for private arbitration.
Although the absence of an administrative system or protective stan-
dards may not present a danger to participants in a plan governed by a
collective bargaining agreement, it could seriously jeopardize the rights
of non-union employees like Barrowclough.l1
7
110. Remarks by ChiefJustice Warren Burger before the American Arbitra-
tion Association and the Minnesota State Bar Association, reprinted in ARB. J.,
Dec. 1985, at 3, 4.
111. Id. at 4. The Chief Justice pointed out that the cost to taxpayers to
sustain one federal judge is more than $250,000 annually. Id. at 5.
112. ChiefJustice Burger stated that "in the public interest we must move
toward taking a large volume of private conflicts out of the courts and into the
channels of arbitration, mediation and conciliation." Id.
113. Id. at 6. According to the Chief Justice, "I cannot emphasize too
strongly to those in business and industry-and especially to lawyers-that every
private contract of real consequence to the parties ought to be treated as a 'can-
didate' for binding private arbitration." Id.
114. The Chief Justice summarized the advantages of private arbitration in
large commercial transactions as including the opportunity to select triers by
joint agreement, the opportunity to select triers with special expertise in a par-
ticular subject matter, the ability to maintain privacy and confidentiality, and the
avoidance of delay caused by crowded court calendars. Id. at 6.
115. For a discussion of the legislative history concerning the use of arbi-
tration in benefit plan disputes, see supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
116. That Congress perceived threats to the rights of benefit plan partici-
pants arising from the use of unregulated arbitration procedures is evident from
the legislative history of ERISA. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
117. See Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 431 F. Supp. 271,
277 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For a discussion of Lewis, see supra notes 100-06 and ac-
companying text.
This casebrief does not suggest that Barrowclough's rights were compro-
mised in the arbitration of his dispute with Kidder, Peabody. For a discussion of
1986] 1189
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's decision in
Barrowclough that contractually based ERISA claims are subject to arbi-
tration unnecessarily undermines a fundamental purpose of ERISA.
The court disregarded clear statutory language that granted benefit plan
participants access to federal court to enforce the terms of their plans.
This decision cannot be justified in terms of the countervailing federal
policy of enforcing collectively bargained agreements, since neither the
Plan itself nor the arbitration agreements were collectively bargained.
The effect of Barrowclough and other decisions compelling arbitration of
contractual claims under ERISA will be to defeat the intent of Congress
to provide a federal forum for these claims because employers can re-
quire arbitration agreements as a condition to participation in the plan.
It is submitted that the clear language of the statute should not have
been set aside in a case such as Barrowclough, which involved unilaterally
imposed arbitration agreements, of questionable applicability to the dis-
pute at hand. 118
Jennifer L. Bragg
the outcome of that arbitration, see supra note 30. The arbitration was con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 752 F.2d
at 928. These rules appear in N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2601 (1980). A look at
the rules reveals several ways in which a claimant might be disadvantaged. For
instance, the rules do not provide for a discovery process, which would be avail-
able in a civil action. Also, the rules expressly state that the arbitrators are not
bound by the rules of evidence, and have sole discretion as to the admissibility,
relevance, and materiality of evidence. Rule 621, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2621
(1980). Finally, the arbitrators are chosen by the Director of Arbitration of the
New York Stock Exchange. Rule 607, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2607 (1980). It
is submitted that this raises the possibility of an industry bias. This concern
about bias was recently addressed by a commentator. See Recent Developments,
supra note 88, at 245. The author noted that confidence in the arbitration pro-
cess is vital, and might be undermined when claimants are required to submit
disputes to arbitrators selected by the securities industry. Id. at 260; see also
Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements
for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 720 (1980) (suggesting that in arbitra-
tion of securities claims all sectors should have equal representation in formula-
tion of rules).
118. The court also relied on the presumption of arbitrability in reaching
its conclusion that Barrowclough's dispute with Kidder, Peabody was covered by
the arbitration agreement. 752 F.2d at 938. For a discussion of the court's rea-
soning, see supra notes 37-38. However, in an earlier decision the Third Circuit
had held that an arbitration agreement similar to that signed by Barrowclough
did not cover a dispute involving the forced sale of stock upon retirement. See
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). InAyres, Merrill Lynch required a broker to sell his
Merrill Lynch stock upon retirement. 538 F.2d at 534. The stock was not pub-
licly traded at the time, and the employee was permitted to own the stock only
because of his employee status. Id. at 533. The employee later charged that the
company had withheld information of its decision to go public in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act, and alleged that had he known of the decision he
would have postponed his retirement and avoided the forced sale of his stock.
Id. at 534. In response, Merrill Lynch invoked the employee's agreement to ar-
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bitrate disputes arising from his employment or its termination. Id. The Third
Circuit refused to order arbitration, observing that although the claims were
connected to the termination of plaintiff's employment in a purely factual sense,
they did not concern the respective duties of the employer and employee. Id. at
535.
Ayres and Barrowclough are similar in important respects. In Ayres, the com-
pany permitted the employee to purchase the stock only because of his em-
ployee status. Id. at 533. Likewise, Barrowclough's participation in the Kidder,
Peabody Plan was also an option made possible because of his employee status.
See supra note 16. Although Ayres purchased the stock and Barrowclough partic-
ipated in the Plan because of their status as employees, neither dispute con-
cerned their rights or duties as employees or related to the terms or conditions
of their employment. Both Ayres and Barrowclough asserted rights under fed-
eral laws. As a stockholder and seller of securities, Ayres alleged violations of
federal and state securities laws. 538 F.2d at 535. As a benefit plan participant,
Barrowclough asserted rights under ERISA. Despite the similarity between
these two cases, the Barrowclough court did not refer to the decision in Ayres, or
attempt to distinguish that case.
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